

Message Text

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

PAGE 01 STATE 101583 TOSEC 040175
ORIGIN SS-15

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 CCO-00 AF-10 ARA-10 EA-10 EUR-12
NEA-10 IO-13 PM-05 SP-02 CIAE-00 DODE-00 INR-10
NSAE-00 PA-01 NSCE-00 SSO-00 ICAE-00 INRE-00 HA-05
/104 R

DRAFTED BY S/S:FWISNER:BABS

APPROVED BY S/S:FWISNER

-----114953 210131Z /21

O 210044Z APR 78 ZFF4

FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO USDEL SECRETARY IMMEDIATE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE STATE 101583 TOSEC 040175

FOR DAVID ANDERSON

E.O. 11652: N/A

TAGS: SOPN

SUBJECT: KISSINGER REMARKS ON AFRICA

1. HENRY KISSINGER DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING INFORMAL
REMARKS TO THE INTERNATIONAL RADIO AND TELEVISION SOCIETY
IN NEW YORK ON WEDNESDAY, APRIL 19.

2. BEGIN TEXT:

I WOULD LIKE TO APPLY THESE CONSIDERATIONS TO ONE AREA
WHICH PROBABLY WILL NOT LOOM AS LARGE IN THE QUESTION
PERIOD AS I SUSPECT THE MIDDLE EAST WILL, NAMELY THE
PROBLEM OF AFRICA.

IN 1975 THE SOVIET UNION FOR THE FIRST TIME INTRODUCED
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

PAGE 02 STATE 101583 TOSEC 040175

ENORMOUS QUANTITIES OF MILITARY EQUIPMENT AND LATER CUBAN
EXPEDITIONARY FORCES IN AN AREA ABOUT AS FAR AWAY FROM THE
SOVIET UNION AS IT IS POSSIBLE TO BE, IN ANGOLA. AT THAT
TIME WE HAD NO PARTICULAR PREFERENCE BETWEEN THE VARIOUS
FACTIONS THAT WERE FIGHTING FOR CONTROL OF THE GOVERNMENT
IN ANGOLA. BUT WE DID BELIEVE THAT THE INTRODUCTION OF
PROXY TROOPS AND OF A BILLION DOLLARS WORTH OF MILITARY

EQUIPMENT, MORE THAN ALL THE REST OF THE WORLD WAS GIVING TO ALL THE REST OF AFRICA PUT TOGETHER, WOULD CREATE A PROBLEM THAT WOULD MAKE FUTURE SOLUTIONS THAT MUCH MORE DIFFICULT. WE WERE PREVENTED FROM DOING WHAT WAS NECESSARY, WHICH DID NOT INVOLVE ANY AMERICAN FORCES, BY THE CONGRESS AT THE TIME.

IN RECENT MONTHS, WE HAVE SEEN ONCE AGAIN IN ETHIOPIA ANOTHER BILLION DOLLARS WORTH OF SOVIET EQUIPMENT AND ANOTHER TWENTY THOUSAND CUBAN TROOPS, AGAIN IN AREAS OF NO CONCEIVABLE HISTORIC INTEREST FOR EITHER OF THOSE COUNTRIES, AND NOW WE ARE DEALING NO LONGER WITH A LOCAL AFRICA SITUATION BUT WITH A GEOPOLITICAL CHALLENGE.

THE MOVE INTO ETHIOPIA CANNOT BE ANALYZED IN TERMS OF THE QUARRELS BETWEEN SOMALIA AND ETHIOPIA. NOR IS THE ISSUE PRIMARILY WHO CROSSED THE BORDER FIRST. THE FIRST THING TO NOTICE IS THAT SOVIET EQUIPMENT WENT FIRST TO SOMALIA, A COUNTRY THAT HAD PUT FORWARD CLAIMS ON THE TERRITORY OF ALL ITS NEIGHBORING STATES; SOVIET EQUIPMENT WAS THUS GUARANTEED TO BE USED IN AN EXPANSIONIST WAY. AND THEN WHEN THAT EQUIPMENT WAS USED FOR THE PRECISE PURPOSE THAT SOMALIA HAD ALWAYS ASKED FOR IT, THE SOVIET UNION SWITCHED SIDES AND BECAME THE DEFENDER OF THE TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY WHICH ITS OWN EQUIPMENT HAD THREATENED TO BEGIN WITH. AND SEVENTEEN THOUSAND CUBAN TROOPS AND A BILLION LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

PAGE 03 STATE 101583 TOSEC 040175

DOLLARS WORTH OF SOVIET EQUIPMENT WENT INTO ETHIOPIA.

IT IS TOO CYNICAL TO BE ASKED TO ACCEPT THE PROPOSITION THAT WHAT IS INVOLVED HERE IS THE UNSELFISH SOVIET DESIRE TO RESPOND TO THE APPEAL OF A SOVEREIGN COUNTRY. THE SOVIET PURPOSE IS GEOPOLITICAL: TO OUTFLANK THE MIDDLE EAST, TO DEMONSTRATE THAT THE U.S. CANNOT PROTECT ITS FRIENDS, TO RAISE DOUBTS IN SAUDI ARABIA RIGHT ACROSS THE RED SEA, IN EGYPT, IN THE SUDAN, AND IN IRAN. AND NOW WE HEAR THAT ONCE AGAIN WE MAY BE FACING THE THREAT OF CUBAN AND SOVIET INTERVENTION IN SOUTHERN AFRICA.

I WOULD LIKE TO STRESS THAT THERE SEEM TO ME AT LEAST FOUR PRINCIPLES TO KEEP IN MIND. THE FIRST IS, I HOPE THAT OUR SECRETARY OF STATE WILL BE SUCCESSFUL IN THE NEGOTIATIONS HE IS NOW UNDERTAKING WITH THE SOVIET UNION ON THE LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC ARMS. I BELIEVE THAT THE CONTROL OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS IS ONE OF THE PREEMINENT PROBLEMS OF OUR PERIOD AND I AGREE THAT IT SHOULD NOT BE LIGHTLY LINKED WITH OTHER ISSUES. BUT I ALSO THINK THAT IT IS IMPORTANT THAT THE SOVIET UNION UNDERSTAND THAT ANOTHER MOVE OF THE KIND WE HAVE SEEN IN ANGOLA AND ETHIOPIA WILL RAISE THE

PRESUMPTION THAT WE ARE FACING A GLOBAL GEOPOLITICAL CHALLENGE INCOMPATIBLE WITH ANY DEFINITION OF DETENTE. AND UNDER THOSE CIRCUMSTANCES I DO NOT SEE HOW ANY AGREEMENT COULD POSSIBLY BE RATIFIED AND HOW DETENTE COULD POSSIBLY

SURVIVE. AND I HOPE THAT THAT WILL BE MADE CLEAR TO THE SOVIET UNION.

THE SECOND IS, IT IS TIME THAT ONE OVERCOMES THE RIDICULOUS MYTH OF THE INVINCIBLE CUBANS. WHO HAS EVER HEARD OF CUBANS CONDUCTING A GLOBAL FOREIGN POLICY? WE CANNOT CONDUCT OUR FOREIGN POLICY UNDER THE THREAT OF THE POSSIBLE INTERVENTION OF CUBAN TROOPS. IT IS A SIGN OF THE DECLINE OF OUR WORLD POSITION THAT WE HAVE INFLICTED ON LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

PAGE 04 STATE 101583 TOSEC 040175

OURSELVES THROUGH VIETNAM, THE COLLAPSE OF EXECUTIVE AUTHORITY PRODUCED BY WATERGATE, AND OUR OWN INTERNAL DISPUTES. TWENTY YEARS AGO THIS WOULD HAVE BEEN CONSIDERED SO ABSURD A PROPOSITION THAT NOBODY COULD HAVE MADE IT SERIOUSLY AND IT IS A PROPOSITION THAT IS BOUND TO UNDERMINE OUR POSITION AROUND THE WORLD.

THIRD, LET US JUSTIFY OUR FOREIGN POLICY BY ARGUMENTS OTHER THAN THE FEAR OF CUBAN MILITARY INTERVENTION. WE MUST MAKE CLEAR TO OTHER COUNTRIES THAT WE WILL NOT BE BLACKMAILED BY CUBAN TROOPS OR SOVIET ARMS. WHATEVER ARGUMENTS CAN BE ADVANCED FOR CONDUCTING OUR FOREIGN POLICY WE WILL NOT ACCEPT THE PROPOSITION THAT IF WE DO NOT ACCEDE TO THE ARGUMENTS OF INDIVIDUAL COUNTRIES THEY WILL THEN CALL IN THE CUBANS, OR THE SOVIETS WILL THEN SEND ARMS.

AND FOURTHLY, OF COURSE WE HAVE AN OBLIGATION TO TRY TO REMOVE THE LEGITIMATE CAUSES OF UNREST AND INSTABILITY IN AFRICA.

NEGOTIATIONS TO THIS EFFECT ARE NOW GOING ON AND IT WOULD BE INAPPROPRIATE FOR ME TO GO INTO THEM IN DETAIL. OF COURSE THE U.S. MUST STAND FOR MAJORITY RULE. THIS WE DID WHEN I WAS IN OFFICE AND I SUPPORT THE EFFORTS OF THE PRESENT ADMINISTRATION IN THIS DIRECTION. BUT MAJORITY RULE MUST BE GIVEN A CONCRETE CONTENT. WHAT EXACTLY IS THE BASIS FOR OUR OPPOSITION TO THE SO-CALLED INTERNAL SOLUTION IN RHODESIA? I FAVOR THE ATTEMPT TO ENABLE ALL LEADERS AND FACTIONS TO PARTICIPATE IN THE PROPOSED ELECTIONS. AT THE SAME TIME LET US TAKE CARE NOT TO TURN MAJORITY RULE INTO A DEVICE BY WHICH THOSE WHO COULD NOT WIN AN ELECTION TRY TO FORCE THEIR WAY INTO OFFICE BY THE LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

PAGE 05 STATE 101583 TOSEC 040175

THREAT OF FORCE. AND MAJORITY RULE MUST NOT BECOME THE
SLOGAN OF THOSE WHO HAVE ALREADY REJECTED A MULTI-PARTY
SYSTEM AND ALREADY ANNOUNCED THAT WHAT THEY WANT TO DO IS
CREATE A ONE-PARTY STATE. AND MAJORITY RULE MUST INCLUDE
PROTECTION FOR MINORITY RIGHTS. IF THE BLACK AND WHITE
COMMUNITIES CANNOT LIVE TOGETHER UNDER THE RULE OF LAW
WE WILL SEE A RACE WAR OF TREMENDOUS PROPORTIONS DEVELOP.
WE CANNOT WANT TO ENCOURAGE THIS.
THE PROBLEMS THAT THIS ADMINISTRATION OR ANY ADMINISTRA-
TION FACES IN DEALING WITH THESE ISSUES IS ENORMOUS. THE
ISSUES CANNOT BE PARTISAN. WHEN THE PRESIDENT TRAVELS AND
THE SECRETARY OF STATE NEGOTIATES, HE HAS TO SPEAK FOR ALL
AMERICANS. BUT THEIR PERCEPTION AT A TIME WHEN THESE
PROBLEMS ARE STILL SUBJECT TO CREATIVE SHAPING IS OF
CRUCIAL IMPORTANCE. IT IS IN THIS SPIRIT THAT I OFFER
THESE EXTEMPORANEOUS REMARKS.

END TEXT. CHRISTOPHER

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

NNN

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

PAGE 01 STATE 101583
ORIGIN ARA-14

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SS-15 /030 R

66011

DRAFTED BY: ARA/CCA:WSSMITH

APPROVED BY: ARA/CCA:WSSMITH

S/S- RPACE

-----003491 220135Z /62

R 212215Z APR 78

FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO USINT HAVANA

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE STATE 101583

FOL TEL SENT ACTION USDEL SECRETARY FROM SECSTATE DTD 21 APR
1978 QTE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE STATE 101583 TOSEC 040175

FOR DAVID ANDERSON

E.O. 11652: N/A

TAGS: SOPN

SUBJECT: KISSINGER REMARKS ON AFRICA

1. HENRY KISSINGER DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING INFORMAL REMARKS TO THE INTERNATIONAL RADIO AND TELEVISION SOCIETY IN NEW YORK ON WEDNESDAY, APRIL 19.

2. BEGIN TEXT:

I WOULD LIKE TO APPLY THESE CONSIDERATIONS TO ONE AREA WHICH PROBABLY WILL NOT LOOM AS LARGE IN THE QUESTION
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

PAGE 02 STATE 101583

PERIOD AS I SUSPECT THE MIDDLE EAST WILL, NAMELY THE PROBLEM OF AFRICA.

IN 1975 THE SOVIET UNION FOR THE FIRST TIME INTRODUCED ENORMOUS QUANTITIES OF MILITARY EQUIPMENT AND LATER CUBAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCES IN AN AREA ABOUT AS FAR AWAY FROM THE SOVIET UNION AS IT IS POSSIBLE TO BE, IN ANGOLA. AT THAT TIME WE HAD NO PARTICULAR PREFERENCE BETWEEN THE VARIOUS FACTIONS THAT WERE FIGHTING FOR CONTROL OF THE GOVERNMENT IN ANGOLA. BUT WE DID BELIEVE THAT THE INTRODUCTION OF PROXY TROOPS AND OF A BILLION DOLLARS WORTH OF MILITARY EQUIPMENT, MORE THAN ALL THE REST OF THE WORLD WAS GIVING TO ALL THE REST OF AFRICA PUT TOGETHER, WOULD CREATE A PROBLEM THAT WOULD MAKE FUTURE SOLUTIONS THAT MUCH MORE DIFFICULT. WE WERE PREVENTED FROM DOING WHAT WAS NECESSARY, WHICH DID NOT INVOLVE ANY AMERICAN FORCES, BY THE CONGRESS AT THE TIME.

IN RECENT MONTHS, WE HAVE SEEN ONCE AGAIN IN ETHIOPIA ANOTHER BILLION DOLLARS WORTH OF SOVIET EQUIPMENT AND ANOTHER TWENTY THOUSAND CUBAN TROOPS, AGAIN IN AREAS OF NO CONCEIVABLE HISTORIC INTEREST FOR EITHER OF THOSE COUNTRIES, AND NOW WE ARE DEALING NO LONGER WITH A LOCAL AFRICA SITUATION BUT WITH A GEOPOLITICAL CHALLENGE.

THE MOVE INTO ETHIOPIA CANNOT BE ANALYZED IN TERMS OF THE QUARRELS BETWEEN SOMALIA AND ETHIOPIA. NOR IS THE ISSUE PRIMARILY WHO CROSSED THE BORDER FIRST. THE FIRST THING TO NOTICE IS THAT SOVIET EQUIPMENT WENT FIRST TO SOMALIA, A COUNTRY THAT HAD PUT FORWARD CLAIMS ON THE TERRITORY OF

ALL ITS NEIGHBORING STATES; SOVIET EQUIPMENT WAS THUS
GUARANTEED TO BE USED IN AN EXPANSIONIST WAY. AND THEN
WHEN THAT EQUIPMENT WAS USED FOR THE PRECISE PURPOSE THAT
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

PAGE 03 STATE 101583

SOMALIA HAD ALWAYS ASKED FOR IT, THE SOVIET UNION SWITCHED
SIDES AND BECAME THE DEFENDER OF THE TERRITORIAL INTE-
GRITY WHICH ITS OWN EQUIPMENT HAD THREATENED TO BEGIN
WITH. AND SEVENTEEN THOUSAND CUBAN TROOPS AND A BILLION
DOLLARS WORTH OF SOVIET EQUIPMENT WENT INTO ETHIOPIA.

IT IS TOO CYNICAL TO BE ASKED TO ACCEPT THE PROPOSITION
THAT WHAT IS INVOLVED HERE IS THE UNSELFISH SOVIET DESIRE
TO RESPOND TO THE APPEAL OF A SOVEREIGN COUNTRY. THE
SOVIET PURPOSE IS GEOPOLITICAL: TO OUTFLANK THE MIDDLE
EAST, TO DEMONSTRATE THAT THE U.S. CANNOT PROTECT ITS
FRIENDS, TO RAISE DOUBTS IN SAUDI ARABIA RIGHT ACROSS THE
RED SEA, IN EGYPT, IN THE SUDAN, AND IN IRAN. AND NOW
WE HEAR THAT ONCE AGAIN WE MAY BE FACING THE THREAT OF
CUBAN AND SOVIET INTERVENTION IN SOUTHERN AFRICA.

I WOULD LIKE TO STRESS THAT THERE SEEM TO ME AT LEAST FOUR
PRINCIPLES TO KEEP IN MIND. THE FIRST IS, I HOPE THAT OUR
SECRETARY OF STATE WILL BE SUCCESSFUL IN THE NEGOTIATIONS
HE IS NOW UNDERTAKING WITH THE SOVIET UNION ON THE LIMI-
TATION OF STRATEGIC ARMS. I BELIEVE THAT THE CONTROL OF
NUCLEAR WEAPONS IS ONE OF THE PREEMINENT PROBLEMS OF OUR
PERIOD AND I AGREE THAT IT SHOULD NOT BE LIGHTLY LINKED
WITH OTHER ISSUES. BUT I ALSO THINK THAT IT IS IMPORTANT
THAT THE SOVIET UNION UNDERSTAND THAT ANOTHER MOVE OF THE
KIND WE HAVE SEEN IN ANGOLA AND ETHIOPIA WILL RAISE THE
PRESUMPTION THAT WE ARE FACING A GLOBAL GEOPOLITICAL CHAL-
LENGE INCOMPATIBLE WITH ANY DEFINITION OF DETENTE. AND
UNDER THOSE CIRCUMSTANCES I DO NOT SEE HOW ANY AGREEMENT
COULD POSSIBLY BE RATIFIED AND HOW DETENTE COULD POSSIBLY

SURVIVE. AND I HOPE THAT THAT WILL BE MADE CLEAR TO THE
SOVIET UNION.

THE SECOND IS, IT IS TIME THAT ONE OVERCOMES THE RIDICU-
LOUS MYTH OF THE INVINCIBLE CUBANS. WHO HAS EVER HEARD
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

PAGE 04 STATE 101583

OF CUBANS CONDUCTING A GLOBAL FOREIGN POLICY? WE CANNOT
CONDUCT OUR FOREIGN POLICY UNDER THE THREAT OF THE POS-
SIBLE INTERVENTION OF CUBAN TROOPS. IT IS A SIGN OF THE

DECLINE OF OUR WORLD POSITION THAT WE HAVE INFLICTED ON OURSELVES THROUGH VIETNAM, THE COLLAPSE OF EXECUTIVE AUTHORITY PRODUCED BY WATERGATE, AND OUR OWN INTERNAL DISPUTES. TWENTY YEARS AGO THIS WOULD HAVE BEEN CONSIDERED SO ABSURD A PROPOSITION THAT NOBODY COULD HAVE MADE IT SERIOUSLY AND IT IS A PROPOSITION THAT IS BOUND TO UNDERMINE OUR POSITION AROUND THE WORLD.

THIRD, LET US JUSTIFY OUR FOREIGN POLICY BY ARGUMENTS OTHER THAN THE FEAR OF CUBAN MILITARY INTERVENTION. WE MUST MAKE CLEAR TO OTHER COUNTRIES THAT WE WILL NOT BE BLACKMAILED BY CUBAN TROOPS OR SOVIET ARMS. WHATEVER ARGUMENTS CAN BE ADVANCED FOR CONDUCTING OUR FOREIGN POLICY WE WILL NOT ACCEPT THE PROPOSITION THAT IF WE DO NOT ACCEDE TO THE ARGUMENTS OF INDIVIDUAL COUNTRIES THEY WILL THEN CALL IN THE CUBANS, OR THE SOVIETS WILL THEN SEND ARMS.

AND FOURTHLY, OF COURSE WE HAVE AN OBLIGATION TO TRY TO REMOVE THE LEGITIMATE CAUSES OF UNREST AND INSTABILITY IN AFRICA.

NEGOTIATIONS TO THIS EFFECT ARE NOW GOING ON AND IT WOULD BE INAPPROPRIATE FOR ME TO GO INTO THEM IN DETAIL. OF COURSE THE U.S. MUST STAND FOR MAJORITY RULE. THIS WE DID WHEN I WAS IN OFFICE AND I SUPPORT THE EFFORTS OF THE PRESENT ADMINISTRATION IN THIS DIRECTION. BUT MAJORITY RULE MUST BE GIVEN A CONCRETE CONTENT. WHAT EXACTLY IS THE BASIS FOR OUR OPPOSITION TO THE SO-CALLED INTERNAL SOLUTION IN RHODESIA? I FAVOR THE ATTEMPT TO ENABLE ALL LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

PAGE 05 STATE 101583

LEADERS AND FACTIONS TO PARTICIPATE IN THE PROPOSED ELECTIONS. AT THE SAME TIME LET US TAKE CARE NOT TO TURN MAJORITY RULE INTO A DEVICE BY WHICH THOSE WHO COULD NOT WIN AN ELECTION TRY TO FORCE THEIR WAY INTO OFFICE BY THE THREAT OF FORCE. AND MAJORITY RULE MUST NOT BECOME THE SLOGAN OF THOSE WHO HAVE ALREADY REJECTED A MULTI-PARTY SYSTEM AND ALREADY ANNOUNCED THAT WHAT THEY WANT TO DO IS CREATE A ONE-PARTY STATE. AND MAJORITY RULE MUST INCLUDE PROTECTION FOR MINORITY RIGHTS. IF THE BLACK AND WHITE COMMUNITIES CANNOT LIVE TOGETHER UNDER THE RULE OF LAW WE WILL SEE A RACE WAR OF TREMENDOUS PROPORTIONS DEVELOP. WE CANNOT WANT TO ENCOURAGE THIS. THE PROBLEMS THAT THIS ADMINISTRATION OR ANY ADMINISTRATION FACES IN DEALING WITH THESE ISSUES IS ENORMOUS. THE ISSUES CANNOT BE PARTISAN. WHEN THE PRESIDENT TRAVELS AND THE SECRETARY OF STATE NEGOTIATES, HE HAS TO SPEAK FOR ALL AMERICANS. BUT THEIR PERCEPTION AT A TIME WHEN THESE PROBLEMS ARE STILL SUBJECT TO CREATIVE SHAPING IS OF

CRUCIAL IMPORTANCE. IT IS IN THIS SPIRIT THAT I OFFER
THESE EXTEMPORANEOUS REMARKS.

END TEXT. CHRISTOPHER UNQTE CHRISTOPHER

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

NNN

Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: X
Capture Date: 01 jan 1994
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: TOSEC, SPEECHES
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 21 apr 1978
Decaption Date: 01 jan 1960
Decaption Note:
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 20 Mar 2014
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1978STATE101583
Document Source: CORE
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: FWISNER:BABS
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: N/A
Errors: N/A
Expiration:
Film Number: D780170-0212
Format: TEL
From: STATE
Handling Restrictions: n/a
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1978/newtext/t19780430/aaaaazaz.tel
Line Count: 390
Litigation Code IDs:
Litigation Codes:
Litigation History:
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM
Message ID: 5b0bfa9-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc
Office: ORIGIN SS
Original Classification: LIMITED OFFICIAL USE
Original Handling Restrictions: n/a
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 8
Previous Channel Indicators: n/a
Previous Classification: LIMITED OFFICIAL USE
Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Reference: n/a
Retention: 0
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 05 may 2005
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review Media Identifier:
Review Release Date: N/A
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
SAS ID: 2889953
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: KISSINGER REMARKS ON AFRICA
TAGS: SOPN, US, XA, INTNTL RADIO & TELEVISION SOCIETY, (KISSINGER, HENRY A)
To: SECRETARY
Type: TE
vdkgvwkey: odb://SAS/SAS.dbo.SAS_Docs/5b0bfa9-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc
Review Markings:
Sheryl P. Walter
Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
20 Mar 2014
Markings: Sheryl P. Walter Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 20 Mar 2014